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ABSTRACT:  This paper is an attempt to analyze the consequence of trade liberalization in 
agriculture in the developed countries on the incidence of child labour in a developing economy 
in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with informal sectors. Adult labour and child 
labour are substitutes to each other in the two informal sectors of the economy and are used 
together apart from capital in producing two exportable commodities. The interesting result that 
appears from the analysis is that agricultural trade liberalization in the developed countries may 
be effective in bringing down the incidence of child labour in the system. The paper substantiates 
the desirability of trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed nations from the perspective 
of the developing economies for reason other than welfare improvement. 
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Trade Liberalization in Agriculture in Developed Nations and Incidence 
of Child Labour in a Developing Economy 
                                      
                                      
 
1.  Introduction: 
 
The incidence of child labour is presently one of the most disconcerting problems in the 
transitional societies of developing economies. According to ILO (2002), one in every six 
children aged between 5 and 17 - or 246 million children are involved in child labour.
1 If the 
“invisible” workers who perform unpaid and household jobs are included, it is likely that the 
estimates would shoot up significantly further.  
In recent literature, the supply of child labour has been attributed to factors such as poverty, lack 
of educational facilities and poor quality of schooling, capital market imperfection, parental 
attitudes including the objectives to maximize present household income etc. However, it is 
generally agreed that the root cause is abject poverty, which compels people to have large 
families and children to go out in the job market and earn their own means of livelihood. A good 
deal of research has already focused on the inextricable connection between poverty and child 
labour. See, for instance, Basu and Van (1998), Basu (1999),  Basu and Tzannatos (2003), 
Edmonds (2001), Admassie (2002) and Grootaert and Patrinos (1999, 2002). They held poverty 
as the primary reason behind child labour in developing countries. 
 
This connection between poverty and child labour is, however, not without question. Some 
studies using micro level data failed to demonstrate a strong relationship between household 
poverty and child labour. Patrinos and Psacharopolous (1997) on their study on Peru, found that 
none of the potential measures of household assets or income appear to play a significant role. 
Ray (2000) finds similar result for Peru. But as pointed out by Basu and Tzannatos (2003), 
“…income that a household targets as minimum acceptable may not coincide with the nation’s or 
                                                 
1 Out of 246 million about 170 million child workers were found in different hazardous works. 
Some 8.4 million children were caught in the worst forms of child labour including slavery, 
trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, forced recruitment for armed conflict, 
prostitution, pornography and other illicit activities (ILO, June 2002). 
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region’s official poverty line. So if we use the head-count ratio based on the official poverty line 
to measure poverty, this may not explain the incidence of child labor”.  
 
Another critique of poverty-based explanations of child labor has come from Bhalotra and Heady 
(2002). They have argued, using data from Pakistan and Ghana, that children work more in 
households which own (or operate) larger amounts of land. Since a larger land holding would 
typically mean greater wealth, this seems to suggest that greater poverty does not lead to greater 
child labor. However, there are also a significant number of micro studies reinforcing the role of 
poverty behind child labour. A recent study by Nagaraj (2002) on the beedi industry in Tamil 
Nadu and Karnataka, India, shows that the number children in the age group 5 to 14 years 
attending school
2, rises strictly monotonically as the household monthly per capita expenditure 
rises. Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) find somewhat similar results in Bolivia showing how 
poverty plays a central role in driving child labour.  Edmonds (2001), using rural household 
survey data from Vietnam, has shown that during 1992-93 and 1997-98 Vietnam’s GNP per 
capita grew at the rate of 6.5% per annum and child labour fell by 26% over the same period. He 
finds that increase in household income can explain 94% of the decline in child labor for 
households at the poverty line. Wahba (2002) and Cartwright (1999) also confirm the role of 
poverty behind child work after conducting empirical surveys in Egypt and Columbia, 
respectively.  
   
Albeit some exceptions, it thus can be argued that the root cause behind child work is abject 
poverty.
3  To eradicate the incidence of child labour, World Development Report 1995 called for 
a multifaceted approach with programmes that increase income security, reduce education costs, 
and improve the quality schooling. 
 
 
In the theoretical literature on child labour, the notable contributors are Basu and Van (1998), 
Ranjan (1999, 2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Jafarey and Lahiri (2002), Dessy (2000) and 
                                                 
2 In the absence of other data, Nagaraj (2002) treats schooling as a kind of complement of child 
labor. This may not be completely valid but it does seem to broadly confirm the hypothesis that 
rising income takes children away from work and into schooling. 
 
3 Some studies didn’t find poverty as a primary factor behind child labour perhaps because, as 
Basu and Tzannatos (2003) maintained, of measurement errors, inappropriately controlled 
endogeneity, arbitrary functional forms used in the estimation and their failure to take into 
account the role of wealth (especially land).   4 
Gupta (2002). Basu and Van (1998) have shown that if child labour and adult labour are 
substitutes (Substitution Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households 
(Luxury Axiom), then unfavourable adult labour markets, responsible for low adult wage rate, is 
the driving force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there 
exists a critical level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate 
considers himself to be poor and not to have the luxury of sending his children to school. He is 
forced to send them to the job market to supplement low family income out of sheer poverty. 
There are some papers in the literature focusing on capital market failure. Ranjan (1999), Baland 
and Robinson (2000) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) emphasize the importance of capital-market 
imperfection as a contributing factor to inefficient child labor. The dynamic implications of 
capital market imperfection have been studied by Ranjan (2001), with similar conclusions 
reached by Basu (1999). On the other hand, Dessy (2000) has advocated the imposition of 
compulsory education as a means to combat the incidence of child labour. Jafarey and Lahiri 
(2002) and Gupta (2002) have examined the efficacy of imposition of trade sanctions on export 




The ongoing process of globalization was expected to produce sizeable downward pressure on the 
problem of child labour in the developing countries by reducing the extent of poverty. Over the 
last two decades, radical measures for reducing tariff barriers and completely doing away with 
non-tariff barriers to ensure freer global trade have been undertaken in manufacturing 
commodities that use capital or skilled labour intensively. However, the attempt to subject 
agricultural commodities to disciplines similar to those that govern trade in manufactures has not 
so far been successful. Moreover, in agriculture, exports from developing countries remain 
severely hampered by massive domestic support and export subsidy programs in developed 
countries, by peak tariffs and difficulties in the implementation of the tariff-quota system 
(UNCTAD, 1999, pp. 41). Besides, agricultural exports from the rich nations, aided by domestic 
supports, drive small farmers out of business in many developing countries. This threatens 
domestic food security and undermines export potentials of the poor nations. 
 
As a consequence of developing countries’ vehement demand for providing accessibility to 
markets of the developed countries the WTO is now embarking upon a new round of negotiations 
on agricultural trade. Multilateral liberalization in the context of the WTO negotiations will 
primarily imply reduced protection of agriculture in developed countries. It will imply reduced   5 
protection against imports and reduced subsidies for domestic production, including reduced 
export subsidies. As multilateral liberalization in agriculture following the Uruguay round has 
been limited in scope and is still being phased in, there is not yet much direct evidence available 
to judge empirically the consequences of such liberalization (see Haug and Øygard 1999). 
However, if the result of reduced trade barriers and increased international competition are 
uniform in both developed or developing countries, the prices of the primary agricultural exports 
of the developing countries are likely to rise because of the probable reductions of the multilateral 
tariffs by the large trading countries and increases in their import demands. Model simulations of 
multilateral trade liberalization, e.g. (Hoekman and Anderson, 1999) are quite unanimous in 
predicting that such liberalization would result in higher world market prices than otherwise for 
those goods currently being protected and subsidised.  
 
The implications of the worldwide trade liberalization in agriculture will be far reaching for the 
developing countries. As these countries are generally exporters of labour-intensive agricultural 
commodities social welfare would definitely improve due to improvements in their terms-of-
trade. Most of the people in these countries will be benefited as a consequence, as they are 
directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture.
4 Poverty is likely to fall and its allied problems 
such as the incidence of child labour are expected to be ameliorated.  
 
Under the circumstances, it would be an interesting theoretical exercise to study the possible 
consequence of the proposed trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed countries on the 
incidence of child labour in the developing economies. However, it should be mentioned that any 
policy effect on the child labour incidence should be carried out in a multi-sector general 
equilibrium framework. This is because a policy designed to mitigate the problem of child labour 
in a targeted sector may drive the children into other sectors of the economy and undertake illegal 
and more hazardous activities. Thus, one cannot evaluate the success of a particular policy unless 
one takes into account its effect on the aggregate number of child workers, spread over different 
sectors of an economy. Unfortunately, economists have so far paid very little attention to analyze 
the problem of child labour using the general equilibrium framework. A few notable exceptions, 
however, are Gupta (2002), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2003) and Chaudhuri and Gupta 
(2004). 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, the net consumers of the agricultural product might be worse off as their real 
incomes fall in terms of the said product. 
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The present paper aims to analyze the consequences of trade liberalization in agriculture in the 
developed nations on the incidence of child labour in a developing economy in terms of a three-
sector general equilibrium model with informal sectors. There are two informal sectors in the 
economy where child labour and adult labour are substitutes and are used together with capital in 
producing two exportable commodities: one agricultural and the other manufacturing. The result 
that appears from the analysis is that trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed countries, 
which raises the prices of the agricultural commodities, is likely to be effective in bringing down 
the magnitude of child labour in the system. The paper points out that agricultural trade 
liberalization in the developed countries is desirable from the perspective of the developing 
countries not only for welfare reasons but also because of the fact that it might be helpful in 
lessening the gravity of the problem of child labour. It should be mentioned that Edmonds and 
Pavcnik (2004) have found that an increase in the price of agricultural export commodity has 
significantly contributed to reductions in the incidence of child labour in Vietnam in the 1990s. 





2.   The Model: 
 
 
We consider a small open backward agricultural economy with three sectors: one formal and two 
informal. One of the two informal sectors (sector 1) produces an agricultural exportable product, 
1 X , with the help of adult labour, child labour and capital. The other informal sector (sector 2) 
produces an exportable manufacturing commodity 2 X
6
, using both types of labour and capital. 
The formal sector (sector 3) is the import-competing sector of the economy producing a 
manufacturing commodity, 3 X . It uses adult labour and capital in its production. We assume that 
                                                 
5 Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004) have empirically examined the relationship between regional and 
intertemporal price movements of a primary export commodity (rice) and the economic activities 
of children using a panel of Vietnamese households. They have observed that reductions in child 
labor are increasing with rice prices. According to their findings overall rice price increase can 
account for almost half of the decline in child labor in Vietnam in the 1990s. 
 
6
  Carpet weaving, leather bag manufacturing, diamond cutting are some of the examples of 
unorganized exportable production activities.  
   7 
the Substitution Axiom
7 of Basu and Van (1998) holds so that in the two informal sectors adult 
and child labour are substitutes and produce two internationally traded commodities.
8 Owing to 
effective wage legislation and unionization of labour, the adult wage rate in the formal sector is 
fixed at  * W , which is greater than the competitive informal sector adult wage rate,W . Capital is 
perfectly mobile among the three sectors of the economy. It is reasonable to assume that the 
formal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the two informal sectors with 
respect to adult labour. In other words, this implies that  ). / ( ) / ( ), / ( 3 3 2 2 1 1 L K L K L K λ λ λ λ λ λ <  
 
Let us now make assumptions regarding relative factor-intensities of the two informal sectors. 
The informal agricultural sector (sector 1) is more child labour intensive (with respect to adult 
labour and less capital intensive (with respect to adult labour) than the informal manufacturing 
sector (sector 2). By transitivity it then implies that sector 1 is also less capital intensive 
compared to sector 2 with respect to child labour. In mathematical terms, we may write 
); / ( ) / ( ), / ( ) / ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 L K L K L C L C λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ < > and,  ) / ( ) / ( 2 2 1 1 C K C K λ λ λ λ <               (1)   
 
Available empirical evidence suggests that the concentration of child labour is the highest in the 
rural sector of a developing economy and that child labour is used intensively directly or 
indirectly in the agricultural sector. In backward agriculture, the production techniques are 
                                                 
7 The substitution axiom emphasizes that adult and child labor are substitutes. In other words, it 
means that adults can do what children do. Some studies presume that there are certain tasks 
specific to children. Expressions like ‘nimble fingers’ to describe child labour tended to 
perpetuate this belief. The substitution axiom expresses a contrary view on this. The ‘nimble 
fingers’ argument, which once has been put forward, especially to carpet weaving, is an excuse 
given by employers and fails to convince researchers (see Burra (1997) and Weiner (1991)). A 
careful study of the technology of production involving children by Levison et al (1998) lends 
strong support to the substitution axiom. They show that adults in India are as good, if not better, 
in producing hand-knotted carpets as children. So from a purely technical point of view it is 
possible to replace child labour with adults. But of course adults cost more and for that reason 
firms may be reluctant to make the transition to adults-only labor. This argument is also 
applicable to girl child labour helping household chore where from a purely technical point of 
view adult female labour can do what girls do.  
 
8 In this paper we have taken care of the child labour engaged directly or indirectly in the export 
sectors. Child labour is used in many cases to produce intermediaries for the export sectors (see 
Swaminathan (1998)) for detailed list of activities carried out by child workers). But there is no 
need from the theoretical point of view to consider these non-traded intermediaries as separate 
sectors. This is because these sectors can be vertically integrated to either or both of the two 
informal export sectors and this case is equivalent to the present one.  
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primitive, use of capital is very low and child labour can almost do whatever adult labour does. 
Farming in backward agriculture is mostly done by using bullocks and ploughs and the cattle-
feeding is entirely done by child labour. Besides, at the time of sowing of seeds and harvest 
children are often used in the family farms for helping adult members of the family. Although 
most adult employment in developing countries is still in agriculture, the proportion of aggregate 
child labour used in agriculture is greater than that of adult labour.
9 On the other hand, in carpet 
weaving, leather bag and shoe manufacturing, diamond cutting, matchbox and fireworks, 
garments industries etc. child labour is often used in many intermediate stages of production. 
Many of these industries have split up into tiny units and shifted the production process to urban 
slums, in order to utilize labour services including child labour at lower wages.
10 According to 
the ILO (2002) report (figure 4, pp. 36), more than 70 per cent of economically active children in 
the developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors and less than 9 per cent are 
involved in manufacturing. The corresponding figures are 79.1 per cent and 3.3 per cent in the 
case of India where the concentration of child labour is the largest in the world. Including all 
other activities 19.9 per cent of child labour in India are engaged in nonagricultural activities. On 
the other hand, in India 64.81 per cent of the adult labour force are engaged in agriculture and 
allied sectors while 25.84 per cent are employed in the informal manufacturing sector (Census of 
India 1991, Selected Socioeconomic Statistics, India 2002).
11 Comparison of the two types of 
production activities in the agricultural and informal manufacturing sectors and the employment 
statistics from India
12 should justify the factor-intensity conditions as expressed in (1).  
 
Production functions satisfy constant returns to scale with positive but diminishing returns to each 
factor. Markets, except the formal sector labour market, are perfectly competitive. The adult 
labour allocation mechanism is of the following type. Adult workers first try to get employment 
                                                 
9 See Ashagrie (1998) and NSSO (2000). 
 
10 One may go through Swaminathan (1998). 
 
11
 These data have also been cited in Chaudhari (1997). Using these figures we find that in India 
in 1991 the child labour-adult labour ratios in agriculture, ) / ( 1 1 L C λ λ , and nonagricultural 
informal sector, ) / ( 2 2 L C λ λ , were 1.22 and 0.77, respectively.  
 
12 Although employment statistics on adult labour in 2001 (Census of India 2001) are available, 
the corresponding data on child labour are still unavailable.   9 
in the formal manufacturing sector that offers a contractual and high wage and those who are 
unable to find employment in the said sector are automatically absorbed in the two informal 
sectors, as there is complete wage flexibility in the latter sectors. Complete mobility of capital 
among the three sectors of the economy ensures full utilization of capital in equilibrium. Owing 
to the small open economy assumption all the three commodity prices are given internationally. 
Finally, we assume that any two factors are substitutes to each other in the different sectors. This 
means that any cross partials of the factor coefficients are positive. 
  
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model. 
Li a = adult labour-output ratio in the i-th sector, i = 1, 2, 3; 
= Ci a child labour-output ratio in the i-th sector, i = 1, 2; 
Ki a = capital-output ratio in the i-th sector, i = 1, 2, 3; 
ji θ = distributive share of the  j -th input in the i-th industry, j = L, K, C;  and, i = 1, 2, 3; 
ji λ = proportion of the  j -th input employed in the i-th industry, j = L, K, C;  and, i = 1, 2, 3; 
i P = world price of the i-th good, i = 1, 2, 3 (exogenously given); 
= i X level of production of the i-th commodity, i = 1, 2, 3; 
* W = unionized adult wage rate in the formal sector; 
W = informal sector adult wage rate; 
= C W  child wage rate; 
R : return to capital; 
i C = consumption of the i -th commodity by each poor working family,  = i 1,2, 3; 
L = adult labour endowment; 
= = ) ( 3 3X a L L F number of adult workers employed in the formal sector; 
= − = ) ( 3 3X a L L L I number of adult workers employed in the two informal sectors; 
K = capital stock of the economy; 
n= number of children in each family; 
C l = supply of child labour by each poor household; 
C L = aggregate supply of child labour;   10 
i
jk S =the degree of substitution among factors in the ith sector,i= 1,2,3. For example, 
), / )( / ( 1 1
1 R a a R S L L LK ∂ ∂ ≡ ) / )( / ( 1 1
1 W a a W S L L LL ∂ ∂ ≡ etc.; 
∧ = proportional change. 
 
 
2.1   Derivation of Supply Function of Child Labour 
 
In this section, we derive the supply function of child labour from the utility maximizing 
behaviour of the representative altruistic poor household. There are Lnumbers of working 
families, which are classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members. 
The adult workers who work in the higher paid formal manufacturing sector comprise the richer 
section of the working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the informal 
sectors constitute the poorer section. There is now considerable evidence and theoretical reason 
for believing that, in developing countries, parents send their children to work out of sheer 
poverty.
13 A distinctive paper in this regard is that of Basu and Van (1998).  Following their 
‘Luxury Axiom’ we assume that there exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) income, 
W , from non-child labour sources, such that the parents will send their children out to work if 
and only if the actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We assume that each worker 
in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income, * W , sufficiently greater than this 
critical level. So, the workers belonging to this group do not send their children to work. On the 
other hand, adult workers employed in the informal sectors earn W amount of wage income, 
which is less than W and, therefore, send many of their children to the job market to supplement 
low family income.  
 
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is determined from the utility 
maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household. We assume that each working 
family consists of one adult member and ‘n’ number of children. The altruistic adult member of 
the family (guardian) decides the number of children to be sent to the work place. The utility 
function of the household is given by 
                                                 
13
 In Section 1, it has been discussed in details that abject poverty is the root cause behind the 
widespread existence of child labour in the developing world.  
   11 
)) ( , , , ( 3 2 1 C l n C C C U U − =                                                                                                   
The household derives utility from the consumption of the final goods and from the children’s 
leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas type of the utility 
function.  
γ ρ β α ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 C l n C C C A U − =                                                                                   (2) 
with  0 > A ,  0 , , , 1 > > γ ρ β α ; and,  . 1 ) ( = + + + γ ρ β α                        
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1.  
 
The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint. 
) ( 3 3 2 2 1 1 W l W C P C P C P C C + = + +                                                                                (3) 
where, W is the income of the adult worker and  C Cl W measures the income from child labour.  
 
Maximization of the utility function subject to the above budget constraint gives us the following 
labour supply function.
14 
)} / ( ) {( C C W W n l γ ρ β α − + + =                                                                                      (4) 
 
This is the supply function of child labour by each poor family. We now analyze its properties. 
First,  C l varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise in W produces a positive income 
effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for his children and therefore decides to send 
a lower number of children to the workplace. An increase in C W , on the other hand, produces a 
negative price effect, which increases the supply of child labour from the family.
15 
 
There are  ) ( 3 3X a L L L I − =  number of adult workers engaged in the two informal sectors and 
each of them sends  C l  number of children to the workplace. Thus, the aggregate supply function 
of child labour in the economy is given by 
) )]( / ( ) [( 3 3X a L W W n L L C C − − + + = γ ρ β α                                                                    (5) 
 
                                                 
14 See Appendix I for mathematical derivation. 
 
15 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating supply 
function of child labour satisfying these two properties.    12 
2.2  The General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality 
conditions relating to the three sectors of the economy are given by the following three equations, 
respectively. 
 
1 1 1 1 P Ra a W Wa K C C L = + +                                                                                                   (6) 
2 2 2 2 P Ra a W Wa K C C L = + +                                                                                                 (7) 
3 3 3 * P Ra a W K L = +                                                                                                             (8) 
 
The factor endowment equations for adult labour, capital and child labour are the following, 
respectively.  
 
L X a X a X a L L L = + + 3 3 2 2 1 1                                                                                                (9) 
K X a X a X a K K K = + + 3 3 2 2 1 1                                                                                             (10) 
C C C L X a X a = + 2 2 1 1                                                                                                            (11)   
 
Using (5) equation (11) can be rewritten as follows. 
= + 2 2 1 1 X a X a C C ) )]( / ( ) [( 3 3X a L W W n L C − − + + γ ρ β α                                            (11.1) 
 
Here, we have seven endogenous variables in the system:  3 2 1 , , , , , X X X R W W C and  C L and 
seven independent equations (namely equations (5) − (10) and (11.1)). The parameters in the 
system are:  γ ρ β α , , , *, , , , , , 3 2 1 W K L P P P and  n. Equations (6) − (8) constitute the price 
system. The system possesses the decomposition property since the three unknowns factor prices, 
C W W, and  R can be determined from the price system alone, independently of the output 
system. Once the factor prices are known the factor coefficients,  ji a s, are also known. Now 
2 1, X X and  3 X are simultaneously obtained from equations (9), (10) and (11.1). Finally,  C L is 
determined from (5). 
 
   13 
2.3  Comparative Static Exercises 
 
In this section, we shall analyze the effect of trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed 
countries on the supply of child labour in the developing economy. The effect of agricultural 
trade liberalization in the developed countries in this model is captured by an increase in the 
international price of the agricultural commodity, 1 P . 
 
Differentiating (6) and (7) it is easy
16 to find that  0 ) ˆ ˆ ( < − C W W when  0 ˆ
1 > P . So an increase in 
1 P lowers the  ) / ( C W W ratio. From (4) it then follows that  C l rises as  C l  and  ) / ( C W W  are 
negatively related. This leads to the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Trade liberalization in agriculture raises the supply of child labour by each 
poor working family. 
 
Proposition 1 can be explained in economic terms in the following way. AsR  is determined from 
the zero profitability condition for sector 3 (equation (8)) and remains unchanged despite a 
change in 1 P , sectors 1 and 2 together can effectively be regarded as a Modified Hechscher-Ohlin 
subsystem (MHOSS). The modification is due to the fact that those two sectors apart from capital 
use adult labour and child labour as inputs where the supply of the latter is endogenously 
determined. An increase in  1 P raises the child wage rate,  C W  and lowers the adult wage, 
W following a Stolper-Samuelson effect as sector 1 is more child labour intensive than sector 2 
with respect to adult labour. As a sequel, the ) / ( C W W ratio falls, which in turn raises the supply 
of child labour from each poor working family,  C l . 
 
Now, differentiating equations (9), (10) and (11) and solving it can be proved
17 that  0 ˆ
3 > X when 
0 ˆ
1 > P under the sufficient conditions: (i) ) / ( ) / (
12 12
3 3 CL CK L K λ λ λ λ ≥ ; and, (ii) 0 ≥ E .Here 
) / ( 3 3 L K λ λ is the capital-labour ratio of sector 3, 
                                                 
16 See Appendix II for derivation. 
 
17 This has been derived in Appendix III. 
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=
12
CK λ ) ( 2 1 2 1 C K K C λ λ λ λ − ; =
12
CL λ ) ( 2 1 2 1 C L L C λ λ λ λ − ; and,
1
1 [{( KL K S E λ = } ) 2
2
2 C KL K S θ λ +     




1 L KC K KC K S S θ λ λ +
i
jk S s are the degrees of substitution between different inputs 
in sector  ; i for  . 2 , 1 = i From our assumptions about the relative factor intensities of the two 
informal sectors (given by (1)) we find that ,
12
CL λ . 0
12
>
CK λ  However, it is important to note that 
the above result holds under a few other sufficient conditions
18 as well. It now follows that 
0 ) ˆ ( ˆ
3 > = X LF in such a situation. This establishes the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: The formal sector expands both in terms of output and employment 
following trade liberalization in agriculture if (i) ) / ( ) / (
12 12
3 3 CL CK L K λ λ λ λ ≥ ; and, (ii)  . 0 ≥ E  
 
We explain proposition 2 as follows. As the  ) / ( C W W ratio falls owing to an increase in  1 P , 
producers in the two informal sectors would substitute child labour by adult labour. So 1 C a and 
2 C a fall and  1 L a and  2 L a increase. This generates a Rybczynski type effect and produces an 
expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 1 (sector 2) as sector 1 is more intensive in the 
use of child labour vis-à-vis sector 2 with respect to adult labour. This is a well-known result in 
the theory of international trade that a Stolper-Samuelson effect contains an element of 
Rybczynski effect if the technologies of production are of the variable coefficient type. The 
capital-output ratios in these two sectors (i.e. 1 K a and 2 K a ) may also change depending on the 
factor relationships between capital and adult labour/child labour. 
 
On the other hand, as the supply of child labour from each poor household increases, the 
aggregate supply of child labour also increases at given 3 X   (i.e. at given 3 3X a L L − ). This, in 
turn, produces another expansionary (contractionary) effect on sector 1 (sector 2) following a 
pure Rybczynski effect. However, sector 3 expands if the subsystem releases some amounts of 
capital and adult labour. This, in turn, depends on the relative factor intensities of the three 
sectors and the degrees of substitution between capital and adult labour/child labour in the two 
                                                 
18
 See Appendix III. 
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informal sectors.
19 Sector 3 expands under the sufficient conditions as stated in proposition 2. 
Nevertheless, we should note that one can find out a few other sufficient conditions (see footnote 
19) under which sector 3 expands. As  3 L a does not change
20 , an expansion of sector 3 implies a 
higher level of employment of adult labour in the formal sector. So the number of poor adult 
workers employed in the two informal sectors decreases.     
 
If the capital-output ratios of the two informal sectors are technologically given,  1 K a and  2 K a are 
constants. This implies that 
i
Kj S s are equal to zero for  2 , 1 = i and  . ,C L j = Hence, the expansion 
of sector 3 depends only on the relative factor intensities of the different sectors. Therefore, the 
following corollary trivially follows. 
 
Corollary 1: When the capital-output ratios of the two informal sectors are technologically fixed, 
an increase in  1 P leads to an expansion of the formal sector both in terms of output and 
employment if  ) / ( ) / (
12 12
3 3 CL CK L K λ λ λ λ ≥ . 
 
Finally, to examine the implication of trade liberalization in agriculture on the incidence of child 
labour in the economy we use the aggregate child labour supply function, which is given by 
equation (5). We should note that the policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) 
through a change in the size of the informal sector adult labour force,  ) ( 3 3X a L L L I − = , as 
these families are considered to be the suppliers of child labour (we call this the adult labour 
reallocation effect); and, (ii) through a change in  C l (the number of child workers supplied by 
each poor family), which results from a change in the  ) / ( W WC ratio (this may be called the 
relative wage effect). 
 
 
                                                 
19 This is a full-employment model. So, if the subsystem releases capital to sector 3, it also 
releases adult labour.  
 
20  R is determined from equation (4), as * W is given exogenously. So an increase in  1 P  cannot 
affect the  ) / * ( R W ratio and hence  3 L a . 
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Differentiating equation (5) one can derive the following expression.
21 
)[ / 1 )( / 1 ( ˆ θ λ = C L 1
12
3 3 ˆ }] ){ 1 / ( ) / ( P E D B F W l W








3 2 2 CL K CK L L C F λ λ λ λ θ θ − + = ;  
                                              (+)              (+) 










> + − + = L CC C CC C C CL C CL C LK S S S S B θ λ λ θ λ λ λ and,                                         
        (+)                 (+)                                  (−)                  










< + − + = L LC L LC L C LL L LL L CK S S S S D θ λ λ θ λ λ λ  
         (+)              (−)                                   (+)  
 
From (12), the following proposition follows immediately.  
 
PROPOSITION 3: Trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed nations is effective in 
reducing the gravity of the problem of child labour in the developing countries under the 
sufficient conditions: (i)  0 > λ ; and,  (ii)  F W l W C C ) / [(γ    . 0 ] ) 1 / (
12
3 3 ≥ − + E
CL L L λ λ λ  
 
From proposition 1 we find that the supply of child labour from each poor working family,  C l , 
rises as  ) / ( C W W decreases. This is the relative wage effect that raises the aggregate supply of 
child labour in the economy. On the other hand, the formal sector (sector 3) expands both in 
terms of output and employment under the sufficient conditions as stated in proposition 2. As the 
formal sector expands, the number of poor working families, which are considered to be the 
suppliers of child labour,  ) ( 3 3X a L L − , decreases. We call this the adult labour reallocation 
effect that exerts a downward pressure on the aggregate supply of child labour,  C L . Therefore, 
there are two opposite effects on  C L .
22 The adult labour reallocation effect dominates over the 
                                                 
21 This has been derived in Appendix IV. 
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 The supply of child labour by each poor working family, C l , rises as the  ) / ( C W W ratio falls. 
This is a partial equilibrium result although as to why the ) / ( C W W ratio falls following an 
increase in  1 P is a general equilibrium consequence. But, the adult labour reallocation effect is   17 
relative wage effect under the sufficient conditions as stated in proposition 3.
23 So the incidence 
of child labour in the economy is likely to decrease following the agricultural trade liberalization 
in the developed countries.    
 
We also note that  1 K a and  2 K a are constants if the capital-output ratios in the two informal sectors 
are given technologically. In this case, 
i
Kj S s are equal to zero for  2 , 1 = i ; and,  . ,C L j = So, 
0 = E in this case. So the following corollary immediately follows. 
 
Corollary 2: When capital-output ratios of the two informal sector are technologically given, 
trade liberalization in agriculture lowers the incidence of child labour in a developing economy if 
(i)  0 > λ ; and, (ii) F . 0 ≥   
 
 
3.  Concluding Remarks: 
 
Trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed countries will be a hotly debated agenda in the 
next few series of meeting of the WTO. The developing countries will leave no stone unturned in 
wresting as much benefits as possible from the rich nations. Although agricultural trade 
liberalization is a long-term process, it depends on the political will of the developed countries. In 
the wealthy nations, agriculture is a politically sensitive sector, subject to strong lobbying from 
interest groups. However, most experts agree that trade liberalization in agriculture will bring net 
benefits to all trading nations and developing nations in particular. If trade in agriculture were 
liberalized the consequence would be increases in the prices of the agricultural commodities. The 
terms-of-trade would move in favour of the developing countries, which are the net exporters of 
primary agricultural products thereby improving their national welfare. The present paper has 
analyzed the consequence of such a liberalized trade policy in agriculture in the developed 
nations on the incidence of child labour in the developing economies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
indeed a general equilibrium outcome. We are grateful to one of the two anonymous referees for 
drawing our attention to this point. 
 
23 In Appendix IV it has been shown that this result holds under other sufficient conditions as 
well.    18 
The analysis has been carried out in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with one 
formal and two informal sectors where adult labour and child labour are substitutes and are used 
simultaneously in the informal sectors of the economy. We have studied the impact of trade 
liberalization in agriculture in the developed countries on the incidence of child labour in this 
setup and found that the incidence of child labour in the society may decrease under reasonable 
sufficient conditions. The paper presents a theoretical foundation of the empirical findings of 
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004) by explaining as to how price increases in the exportables caused a 
steep decline in the incidence of child labour in Vietnam in the 1990s. The paper also provides a 
rationale for trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed economies for reason other than 
welfare improvement by pointing out that the policy may also help to lessen the gravity of the 
problem of child labour, which the developing countries are disconcerted with. However, how 
much accessibility to the markets for agricultural commodities in the developed countries, the 
developing nations can extort in the next few rounds of the WTO meetings would ultimately be 
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APPENDIX I: Derivation of supply function of child labour 
 
Maximizing equation (2) with respect to  3 2 1 , , C C C and  C l  and subject to the budget constraint 
(3) the following first-order conditions are obtained.  
) ) /( ) (( )) /( ) (( )) /( ) (( )) /( ) (( 3 3 2 2 1 1 C C W l n U C P U C P U C P U − = = = γ ρ β α                     (A.1) 
From (A.1) we get the following expressions. 
)} /( ) ( { 1 1 P W l n C C C γ α − =                                                                                                    (A.2) 
)} /( ) ( { 2 2 P W l n C C C γ β − =                                                                                                   (A.3) 
)} /( ) ( { 3 3 P W l n C C C γ ρ − =                                                                                                    (A.4)                                     
 
Substitution of the values of  1 C ,  2 C and  3 C into the budget constraint and further simplifications 
give us the following child labour supply function of each poor working household. 
)} / ( ) {( C C W W n l γ ρ β α − + + =                                                                                           (4) 
 
APPENDIX II: Effects of trade liberalization in agriculture on W and C W  
 
AsR is determined from equation (8), it is independent of any changes in 1 P . In other words, we 
have . 0 ˆ = R Differentiating (6) and (7), solving and putting  0 ˆ = R , the following expressions are 
obtained. 
1 2 ˆ ) / 1 ( ˆ P W C θ θ =                                                                                                                   (A.5) 
1 2 ˆ ) / 1 ( ˆ P W L C θ θ − =                                                                                                               (A.6)   
From (A.5) and (A.6) it follows that  
1 2 2 ˆ ) )( / 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( P W W L C C θ θ θ + = −                                                                                         (A.7)         
where,  0 ) ( 2 1 2 1 < − = L C C L θ θ θ θ θ  as the informal agricultural sector is more child labour-
intensive vis-à-vis the informal manufacturing sector with respect to adult labour. Given that 
0 < θ , from (A.7) it follows that  0 ) ˆ ˆ ( < − C W W when  0 ˆ
1 > P . So, an increase in  1 P lowers the 
) / ( C W W ratio.  
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APPENDIX III: Effects of agricultural trade liberalization on  3 X and  3 3X aL  
 
As the rate of return to capital,R , is determined from equation (8), we haveR ˆ 0 = when  . 0 ˆ
1 > P   
Now total differentiation of (9) yields 




} ) / ( ) / ( ) / ){( / ( ˆ ) / ( 1 1 1 1 dR R a dW W a dW W a L X X L a X L C C L L i Li i ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ − = Σ  
} ) / ( ) / ( ) / ){( / ( 2 2 2 2 dR R a dW W a dW W a L X L C C L L ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ −  
                                    } ) / ){( / ( 3 3 dR R a L X L ∂ ∂ −  
Using the result that  0 ˆ = R  from the above expression we can write 








1 λ λ λ λ + − + −               (A.8) 
 
Similarly differentiating (10) and (11.1) the following expressions are obtained, respectively.  








1 λ λ λ λ + − + −        (A.9) 
and, 
= − + + 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 ˆ )} 1 /( { ˆ ˆ X X X L L C C λ λ λ λ  








1 γ λ λ γ λ λ − + − + + −     (A.10) 
 
Solving (A.8)−(A.10) by Cramer’s rule and simplifying one gets 




1 2 1 2 1 C C CL C CL C L K K L W l W S S γ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ + + − − =  








1 2 1 2 1 λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ + − − + − +  




1 2 1 2 1 C C CC C CC C L K K L W l W S S γ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ − + − −  








1 2 1 2 1 λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ + − − + − +  
Substituting W ˆ and  C W ˆ  from (A.5) and (A.6) into the above expression and rearranging terms we 
may write 
= 3 ˆ X 1
12
2 2
12 ˆ ] ) )( / ( )[ / 1 )( / 1 ( P E D B W l W
CL L C C C LK λ θ θ γ λ θ λ + − + + −
                 (A.11)  
 
Here,   23 






3 3 CK L CL K LK L L λ λ λ λ λ λ λ − + − =                                                  (A.12) 
where 0 ) ( 2 1 2 1
12
> − = L K K L LK λ λ λ λ λ ; =
12
CL λ 0 ) ( 2 1 2 1 > − C L L C λ λ λ λ ; =
12
CK λ 2 1 ( K C λ λ










> + − + = L CC C CC C C CL C CL C LK S S S S B θ λ λ θ λ λ λ                                                  
                                 (+)                 (+)                                  (−)                  










< + − + = L LC L LC L C LL L LL L CK S S S S D θ λ λ θ λ λ λ  
         (+)              (−)                                   (+)  








1 L KC K KC K C KL K KL K S S S S E θ λ λ θ λ λ + − + =  
                         (+)                                 (+) 
[
i
jk S s are the degrees of substitution among inputs in sector  ; i and, 














LL S S for  . 2 , 1 = i From our assumptions about relative 
factor intensities of different sectors (given by (1)) we find that
12
LK λ , ,
12
CL λ . 0
12
>
CK λ ]  
 
From (A.12) it follows that  0 > λ under any one of the following two sufficient conditions. 
) / ( ) / (
12 12
3 3 CL CK L K λ λ λ λ ≥                                                                               (A.13.1) 
) / ( )) 1 /( 1 (
12 12
3 LK CK L λ λ λ ≥ −                                                                      (A.13.2) 
It may be pointed out in this context that even if neither (A.13.1) nor (A.13.2) holds, we 
get  0 > λ when the sum of any one of the two positive terms and the negative term in (A.12) is 
outweighed by the remaining positive term.  
 
From (A.11) it now follows that 
0 ˆ
3 > X  when  0 ˆ
1 > P under the following sufficient conditions: 
(i) ) / ( ) / (
12 12
3 3 CL CK L K λ λ λ λ ≥ ; and, 
(ii)  . 0 ≥ E                                                                                                                       (A.14)  
The sufficient condition (i) in (A.14) may be replaced by ) / ( )) 1 /( 1 (
12 12
3 LK CK L λ λ λ ≥ − or simply 
by 0 > λ . Besides, condition (ii) also is not a necessary one. Even it can be substituted by 
other conditions like 0 ) ( ≥ + E B , 0 ) ( ≥ − D E , 0 ) ( ≥ + − E D B etc.   24 
Now, if the capital-output ratios of the two informal sectors are given technologically, we have 
1 K a ,  2 K a . 0 =  This implies that  . 0 = E  Hence,  0 ˆ
3 > X  when  0 ˆ
1 > P only under the sufficient 
condition (i) as given in (A.14).  
 
The formal sector employs  ) ( 3 3X a L L F = number of adult workers. As  * W is given and R does 
not change due to an increase in  1 P ,  3 L a remains unchanged. Therefore, we have 3 ˆ ˆ X LF = . Thus, 
an increase in  1 P leads to an expansion of the formal sector both in terms of output and 
employment of adult labour under the sufficient conditions as stated in (A.14).  
 
 
APPENDIX IV: Effect of trade liberalization in agriculture on  C L  
 
Totally differentiating equation (5) and rearranging terms we get the following expression. 
R S X W W W l W L LK L L L L C C C C ˆ )) 1 /( ( ˆ )) 1 /( ( ) ˆ ˆ )( / ( ˆ 3
3 3 3 3 3 λ λ λ λ γ − − − − − − =                (A.15)     
 
Using (A.7) and (A.11), equation (A.15) can be rewritten as  
1 2 2 ˆ ) )( / 1 )( / ( ˆ P W l W L L C C C C θ θ θ γ + − =  




1 2 1 2 1 3 3 )) / ( ){( )[( / 1 )( / 1 )( 1 / ( C C C CL C CL C L K K L L L W l W S S θ γ λ λ λ λ λ λ θ λ λ λ + + − − +  




1 L C C CC C CC C W l W S S θ γ λ λ − + −  








1 2 1 2 1 L KC K KC K C KL K KL K C L L C S S S S θ λ λ θ λ λ λ λ λ λ + − + − +  








1 2 1 2 1 ˆ }] ) ( ) ){( ( P S S S S L LC L LC L C LL L LL L C K K C θ λ λ θ λ λ λ λ λ λ + − + − −    
 
Using (A.12), rearranging terms and simplifying we get 
)[ / 1 )( / 1 ( ˆ θ λ = C L 1
12
3 3 ˆ }] ){ 1 / ( ) / ( P E D B F W l W








3 2 2 CL K CK L L C F λ λ λ λ θ θ − + =  
                                           (+)             (+) 
Other notations like  E D B , , have already been defined. 
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From (12) we find that  0 ˆ < C L when  0 ˆ
1 > P under the following sufficient conditions: 
(i)  0 > λ ; and,  
(ii)  F W l W C C ) / [(γ    . 0 ] ) 1 / (
12
3 3 ≥ − + E
CL L L λ λ λ                                                              (A.16) 
 
It may be noted that in place of condition (i) in (A.16) one may write 
) / ( ) 1 / 1 (
12 12
3 LK CK L λ λ λ ≥ − or ) / ( ) / (
12 12
3 3 CL CK L K λ λ λ λ ≥ . On the other hand, condition (ii) may 
be replaced by either 0 )] )( 1 / ( ) / [(
12
3 3 ≥ − − + D E F W l W
CL L L C C λ λ λ γ ; or,  F W l W C C ) / [(γ  
. 0 )] )( 1 / (
12
3 3 ≥ + − + E B
CL L L λ λ λ  Hence, there are quite a few number of sufficient conditions 
under which 0 ˆ < C L when  0 ˆ
1 > P .  
                           